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1. Introduction
Shimer (2003) pointed out that the basic Mortensen-Pissarides (1994) model does not generate nearly
enough volatility in unemployment and vacancies, for plausible parameter values.  Hall (2005) argued
that this problem can be fixed if the Nash bargaining component of the model is dropped: Hall assumed
that wages are sticky in the sense that the wage level in a previous contract establishes a “social norm”
that largely determines the wage in the next contract.  In the absence of a theory of social norms, this
solution effectively requires the introduction of a free parameter.  The question in this paper is whether an
extension of the Mortensen-Pissarides model to allow for informational rents can explain the volatility of
unemployment in a more parsimonious way.  A much more elaborate treatment of private information in
this context is given by Menzio (2004).  Nagypál (2004) has shown that heterogeneity in workers’
(private) evaluations of nonpecuniary job characteristics can substantially increase the volatility of
unemployment.
2. A Model of Sticky Wages with Private Information and Aggregate Shocks
The model is a simplified version of the model analyzed in Kennan (2003).  A successful job match
generates a surplus to be divided between the worker and the employer. The value of the worker’s output
is modeled as a binary random variable whose realization (“L” for low or “H” for high) is observed
privately by the employer when the match is made.  The probability of drawing a high surplus is a
publicly observed Markov pure jump process with two states (“b” for bad and “g” for good), and exit
hazards 8b and 8g.  The probability of the high surplus is assumed to be higher in the good state; for
simplicity, the probability of the high surplus is assumed to be zero in the bad state.
2
Job and worker flows are modeled in the standard way, following Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). 
When the joint continuation value from a match falls below the joint opportunity cost, the match is
destroyed.  The job destruction hazard rate is a constant, *, and there is a constant returns matching
function that generates a flow of new matches M(NU,NV) from unemployment and vacancy stocks NU and
NV. There is an infinitely elastic supply of potential vacancies, and the actual number of vacancies posted
is such that the expected profit from a vacancy is zero.
The match surplus is divided in the following way.  Either the employer or the worker is randomly
selected to make an offer, and if this offer is rejected the match dissolves.  Clearly, the employer’s offer
will just match the worker’s reservation level, which is the value of searching for another match.  The
worker effectively has two choices: an offer that exhausts the low surplus, with a sure acceptance, or an2
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offer that exhausts the high surplus, with acceptance only if the high surplus has actually been realized.  It
is assumed that the parameters are such that the worker always finds it optimal to demand the low surplus.
The match surplus depends on whether the employer draws a high or low value from the output
distribution, and it also depends on the aggregate state.  Let yL
b and SL
b be the flow surplus and the
continuation value of the match when the output value is low, and the aggregate state is bad, and similarly
for the other configurations.  For simplicity, it is assumed that the difference between the low and high
output values does not depend on the aggregate state.  That is, yH
g - yL
g
  = yH
b - yL
b = )y.  
Let U and V denote the state-dependent continuation values of an unmatched worker and an
unmatched employer, and let G denote the joint continuation value of a matched worker-employer pair.  It
is assumed that there is free entry of employers, so that V is zero in all states.  In the low-output state, the
joint continuation  values are determined by the following asset pricing equations
The (state-dependent) match surplus is the difference between the gross continuation value G and the
joint continuation value of an unmatched worker, U.  Thus
where )U = U
g - U
b.  This implies
where 7 = 8b +8g.  Substituting this in (2) gives3
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Similarly, for a high-output match, the surplus values are given by
The effect of the aggregate state on the match surplus is given by
Thus if an unmatched worker has better prospects when the aggregate state is good, the match surplus
might be lower when the aggregate state is good, for a given output draw.  On the other hand there is a
higher probability of drawing a high output value in the good aggregate state.
The effect of the output draw on the match surplus is given by
The rate at which unemployed workers find new matches is M(NU,NV)/NU = m(2), where 2 = NV/NU
represents market tightness, and m(2) = M(1,2).  The function m is assumed to be strictly increasing, and
concave.  When a match is made, the worker is selected to make an offer with probability <.  In this case,
the worker gets the low-output surplus, and the employer gets an informational rent if the realized match
value is high.  If the employer is selected to make an offer, the worker gets the reservation level U and the4
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employer gets the whole surplus.  Thus an unmatched worker’s continuation values are determined by the
asset pricing equations
where w0 is the flow value of unemployment (including unemployment benefits and the value of leisure).
Thus
Employers post new vacancies to the point where the net profit from doing so is zero.  When a match
is made, the employer gets an informational rent if the match value is high, and also gets a fraction 1-< of
the low-output surplus (in expectation).  Thus the zero-profit conditions implied by free entry are
where c is the flow cost of maintaining a vacancy.
It is convenient to define 0 = 2/m(2) as the expected duration of a vacancy.  Then the free-entry
conditions can be written as5
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The model can be solved as follows.  For given values of 0
b and 0




Equations (2) and (3) can be rearranged to give U
b and U





can then be expressed in terms of 0
b and 0
g as
Next (12) can be substituted in (9), giving
After eliminating U
b and U
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where H(0) = 2, and h(0) = m(2).  It is assumed that the function 0 = 2/m(2) is invertible, and that the
inverse function H is convex, and that the function m(2) is concave.  Then (15) defines a mapping 
where F is a function which is concave, and quasi-increasing (meaning that the component functions F1
and F2 are both concave functions, with F1 increasing in 0
g, and F2 increasing in 0
b).  Thus, by the
uniqueness theorem in Kennan (2001), there is at most one positive solution.   For example, if 
m(2) = a%& 2, with a> 0, then 0 = (1/a)%& 2, so H(0) = a
2 0
2, and h(0) = a
2 0, so F is concave and quasi-
increasing.
Optimality of Pooling Offers
It is assumed that when a match is made in the good aggregate state, and the worker is selected to
make an offer, it is optimal to demand the low surplus, rather than demand the high surplus at the risk of
destroying the match.  Thus the equilibrium surplus values must satisfy the following no-screening
condition




























































The low surplus in the good aggregate state is
So the no-screening condition is
This reduces to 
Although this condition does not say explicitly which parameter values are consistent with a pooling
equilibrium, it is straightforward to check whether the condition is satisfied in any proposed equilibrium. 
It is clear from (15) that the equilibrium depends only on the product p)y, but not on the components of
this product (given the values of all of the other parameters).  Thus if the no-screening condition holds for
p = p0 , then it also holds for all values of p #p0 , with )y adjusted to keep the product p )y constant. 
Unemployment Volatility
Standard parameter values are used as far as possible, following Shimer (2003) and Hall (2003).  The
simplest choice for the matching function is a constant-returns Cobb-Douglas function that is symmetric
in unemployment and vacancies.  This implies m(2) = a%& 2, and a is set at 6.8, per annum (Shimer uses
a = 1.7 for quarterly data).  The job destruction rate * is set at .42 per annum, so that the quarterly rate is
exp(-.25*) = 0.1.  In the NBER postwar data, the average duration of a recession is 10 months, and the
average duration of an expansion is 57 months.  This implies that the exit hazards are 8g = 12/57 and
8b = 12/10.8
The low output value is normalized to 1.  Since all matches produce low output in the bad aggregate
state, the aggregate output level in the bad state is also 1.  The difference between high and low output
then determines the variability of output.  Let Yb and Yg denote aggregate state-contingent productivity
levels.  The invariant distribution has mass 8
g/7 on the bad state, and 8
b/7 on the good state.  Expected
productivity is
where )Y = Yg - Yb = p)y.  The variance is given by
This implies
If the process is symmetric, the standard deviation is half of the difference between Yb and Yg. 
Otherwise, the standard deviation is less than half of the difference.  If the ratio of the transition rates is
far from 1, the standard deviation can be made arbitrarily small, for any fixed difference (because the
process spends virtually all of its time in one state).  Setting )Y = .042, with 8g = 12/57 and 8b = 12/10
and Yb = 1 gives FY/:Y = .014.  According to Shimer (2003), the coefficient of variation of U.S. aggregate
labor productivity is .018.  Since the basic question is whether informational rents can explain why
unemployment is much more volatile than the underlying shocks, a process that understates the volatility
of productivity errs on the side of caution.























Table 1: Parameter Values
Parameter Notation Value Comments
matching function m(2)6 . 8 %& 2 Shimer
recession exit hazard 8b 12/10 recession duration (10 months)
expansion exit hazard 8g 12/57 expansion duration (57 months)
unmatched flow payoff w0 0.4 Shimer
low output yL 1 normalization
informational rent p)y 0.042 volatility of labor productivity
vacancy flow cost c .54 Shimer
separation rate * .42 Shimer (see text)
interest rate r .05
The steady-state unemployment levels are determined in the usual way as
The equilibrium values of 2
b and 2
g for the parameters in Table 1 can be obtained from the following
equations:
This is an equation system of the form x = f(x), where x = (%& 2
b,2
g), and where f is concave, and
quasi-increasing.  Thus, by the uniqueness theorem in Kennan (2001), there is at most one positive
solution.  And there is a positive solution, at (%& 2
b = .9313030242,  2
g  = 2.995088793).




















This condition is satisfied at the equilibrium value of 2
g if p # 0.0705.
Table 2 shows that these parameter values can generate realistic variations in the unemployment rate.
To illustrate the importance of informational rents in generating this result, the table includes the steady
state unemployment rates for a baseline parameter set that matches the variance of aggregate productivity
by letting the match surplus depend on the aggregate state, with no idiosyncratic variation.  The parameter
values are as in Table 1, but with yL
b = 1, yL
g = 1.042, and p)y = 0.  In this case, the unemployment rate is
virtually constant.










Table 3 shows results for some alternative values of the vacancy cost, the separation rate, and the
flow value of unemployment.  Large changes in these parameters have virtually no effect on  volatility. 
Thus the ability of the model to explain unemployment volatility is based almost entirely on the presence
of informational rents.  The key point is that the informational rent can be large enough to amplify the
underlying productivity shocks, without being too large to sustain a pooling equilibrium.11
Table 3: Unemployment Volatility (no informational rent)
Baseline Low c Low * Low w0
Baseline 0.54 .42 .40




* 5.86% 4.14% 2.934% 2.54%
ug
* 5.70% 4.02% 2.852% 2.49%
Recently, Hagedorn and Manovskii (2005) have argued that the Mortensten-Pissarides model can
generate realistic unemployment fluctuations if the value of the worker’s outside option is close to the
value of production.  In the model considered here, this means setting w0 near 1.  Hagedorn and
Manovskii calibrated w0 as .943, with < = .061.  Table 4 explores the implications of these parameter
values, in the model with no informational rents.
Table 4: Unemployment Volatility (no informational rent)




















* 6.22% 17.28% 1.67% 5.80% 33.9%
ug
* 3.45% 14.65% 1.62% 4.97% 22.9%
When the workers’ outside opportunities are almost as good as their market  production opportunities,
it makes sense to reduce the number of vacancies.  Moving workers into jobs raises the value of their
output, but not by much, and in order to move workers into jobs, it is necessary to expend resources on
vacancy costs.  Reducing the number of vacancies economizes on the vacancy costs (because it reduces
congestion); workers spend more time out of employment, but that is not very costly. Even if the value of
the outside opportunity is the same as the value of production in the bad aggregate state, it still makes
sense to move workers into jobs.  This is because there may be a transition to the good aggregate state,12
and when that happens, employed workers are more productive than unemployed workers.  If this
transition is unlikely, the unemployment rate in the bad state will be high.  But in the data, recessions are
relatively short-lived, so although the Hagedorn and Manovskii calibration yields high unemployment
rates, there is not much difference between the level of unemployment in different states.13
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